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ON THE LIKELY 
EXTENT OF FALLS IN 
IRISH HOUSE PRICES  
Morgan Kelly∗  
 Looking at house price cycles across the OECD since 1970, we 
find a strong relationship between the size of the initial rise in price 
and its subsequent fall. Were this relationship to hold for Ireland, it 
would predict falls of real house prices of 40 to 60 per cent over a 
period of 8 to 9 years. The unusually large size of the Irish house 
building industry suggest that any significant house price fall that does 
occur could impose a difficult adjustment on the economy.  
Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to look at the likely behaviour of 
Irish house prices based on the experience of economies that have 
gone through similar booms. Looking at nearly 40 booms and busts in 
OECD economies since 1970, we find that the size of the initial 
boom is a strong predictor of the size and duration of the subsequent 
bust.  
1. 
Introduction 
Typically, real house prices give up 70 per cent of what they gained 
in a boom during the bust that follows. This is a remarkably robust 
relationship, holding across very different OECD housing markets 
over more than 30 years.  
Were this relationship to hold for Ireland, it would predict a fall 
in real house prices of around 40 to 60 per cent, over a period of 8 
or 9 years. Assuming an inflation rate of 2 per cent, this would 
translate into an annual fall of average selling prices of 6 to 7 per cent.  
Falls of this magnitude and duration are not unprecedented 
internationally. For example, the real price of Dutch houses fell by 
around half during the 1980s, as did those in Finland during the 
early 1990s. However, other large housing busts occurred in 
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economies with high rates of housing occupancy and relatively slowly 
growing stocks of houses. In Ireland, by contrast, housing stock has 
been growing at around 5 per cent per year, with about 15 per cent 
of the housing stock lying empty, increasing the potential for larger 
price falls than in previous OECD housing busts.  
Our estimate is in contrast with existing studies that measure over-
valuation by the size of a regression residual and find over-valuation 
of around 20 per cent. We demonstrate below, however, that unless 
based on very long run time series, such regressions are effectively 
meaningless.  
The principal macroeconomic reason for being concerned about 
a fall in Irish house prices is its impact on residential investment.  
Typically, an industrialised economy gets around 5 per cent of its 
income from building new houses, around the same that it gets from 
household spending on recreation. Ireland currently derives nearly 
three times this amount from building and selling houses.  Any 
sudden fall of residential investment to normal international, and 
national historical, levels, could have a substantial impact on national 
income, government finances, and unemployment: fewer than 15 per 
cent of construction workers are immigrants.  
Falls in residential investment, moreover, can be sudden as the 
example of Arizona shows. Until late 2005, Arizona was 
experiencing a house price and construction boom similar to 
Ireland’s. Then, as sales of new houses stalled around the start of 
2006, building fell suddenly:  from around 8,000 starts in May 2006 
(similar to Irish levels last year) to around 3,000 in November.  
The stagnation of the housing market even below the stamp 
duty threshold makes it evident that the reduction or elimination of 
stamp duty will not alter the basic dynamics of the housing market. 
Markets like housing are driven by fear of offering less than other 
bidders and ending up with nothing. With a large inventory of 
unsold houses, the permanent-tsb house price index showing monthly 
falls, and the irishpropertywatch.com tracking site showing that cuts 
in asking prices of €50,000 are now commonplace, potential buyers 
have an incentive to wait and see if prices will fall further. At the 
same time, rents are likely to fall as discouraged vendors attempt to 
let out empty properties.  
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 rehearses the 
relevant economic theory of rational frenzies in asset markets. 
Section 3 looks at the nearly 40 cases since 1970 where OECD 
economies have experienced house price rises followed by falls, and 
shows that the magnitude of the boom is a strong predictor of the 
size and duration of the subsequent bust. Section 4 shows how the 
stagnation of rents since 2000 while house prices doubled means 
that the Irish housing market has not been driven by strong 
fundamental demand. Section 5 looks at the possible magnitude and 
duration of house price falls, and their potential macroeconomic 
effects.  
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The familiar efficient markets hypothesis predicts that changes in 
asset prices are unpredictable. The price reflects individuals' 
information about asset’s present value and changes as this 
information changes. Agents with good information buy, driving up 
the price, and those with bad information sell, driving it down.  
2. 
Economic 
Theory 
However, instantaneous revelation of information through trade is 
not possible in house markets due to the very large transaction costs 
involved. In addition, the market lacks means for individuals to 
convey negative information through short sales.  
As a result, housing markets are better modelled as information 
cascades: the actions of other agents signal their private information 
and can cause individuals to ignore their own signals and follow the 
herd (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Two models in the 
cascade literature are particularly useful for understanding the 
dynamics of housing markets: the rational frenzies model of Bulow 
and Klemperer (1994) and the wisdom after the fact model of 
Caplin and Leahy (1994). 
Bulow and Klemperer (1994) model rational frenzies in auctions 
where participants reveal their valuations by bidding. Suppose that 
there are k items available. If individual reservation prices were 
known with certainty, everyone would wait until the price fell to just 
above the reservation price of the k + 1-th highest person, and then 
all buy together.  In practice, only the probability distribution of 
reservation values is known, and by bidding, or failing to bid, 
individuals reveal information about their valuations, allowing all 
participants to update their estimates about the value of the k + 1-th 
highest reservation price.  
As a result, bidders with very different valuations have very similar 
willingness to pay. Price drops until one person bids. The 
information this reveals about the true distribution of willingness to 
pay can set off a bidding frenzy among the other bidders, driving up 
price again until it becomes clear that price is again above 
willingness to pay.  Bidding then stops, causing prices to collapse 
until another bidding frenzy starts.  
As well as being volatile, Bulow-Klemperer predict that the 
relationship of house prices to fundamentals such as income and 
interest rates need not be straightforward. To the extent that 
individuals depart from Bayesian rationality, altering reservation 
values in response to observed trends in prices, these effects will be 
amplified.  
Caplin and Leahy (1994) look at investment where individuals 
have Gaussian signals. If the true state is bad, individuals continue 
to invest, driven by the dominating effect of past actions. Eventually, 
however, because signals are not bounded, a few agents get 
sufficiently bad signals to induce them to stop investing, causing 
priors rapidly to move to a belief that the state is bad, leading to a 
market crash and “wisdom after the fact”.  
 
Economic theory predicts that house prices should not follow a 
random walk, but should be a mean-reverting process of booms and 
crashes around a slowly increasing trend reflecting the growth of 
household income. This is what the international data show.  
3. 
Mean 
Reversion in 
House Prices Large falls in real house prices in the aftermath of housing booms 
are common internationally.  Table 1 shows the 18 cases since 1970 
where OECD economies have experienced falls in real house prices 
of at least 20 per cent, along with the previous price rise, and the 
duration of the fall. It can be seen that, in contrast to stock or 
currency markets, falls are prolonged, usually lasting 5 to 7 years, with 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Japan all experiencing more than a 
decade of falls. This reflects the reluctance of sellers to cut nominal 
prices, meaning that inflation does most of the work in reducing real 
prices.1
Table 1: Magnitude and Duration of Falls in Real House Prices 
 Peak Year % Fall Previous 
Rise 
Duration of 
Fall  
Netherlands 1978 50 98 7 
Finland 1989 -48 109 6 
Switzerland 1989 -39 70 10 
Norway 1987 -39 53 6 
Denmark 1978 -36 22 4 
New Zealand 1975 -35 57 5 
Sweden 1979 -35 26 6 
Spain 1977 -33 24 4 
Denmark 1986 -32 52 6 
Japan 1974 -31 56 4 
Italy 1982 -30 84 4 
Finland 1974 -30 22 5 
Japan 1991 -27 78 10 
Sweden 1990 -27 38 6 
Italy 1992 -26 65 6 
Switzerland 1973 -26 34 4 
Ireland 1981 -22 53 5 
Canada 1981 -20 6 4 
 
Shiller (2006) looks at three long series of real house prices: 
Amsterdam from 1628 to 1973, Norway from 1819 to 1989, and the 
United States from 1890 to 2005. In all cases he finds that although 
there are substantial and long lasting peaks and troughs, there is 
scarcely any upward long-run trend in prices.  
Figure 1 shows the same pattern for smaller OECD economies:  
the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, since 
1970. The diagram shows the ratio of average house prices to 
disposable income but real house prices show a very similar pattern. 
Again, as economic theory predicts, there is considerable volatility and 
no sign of long-run trends. In contrast to stock price data, the 
tendency of prices to return to their long-run average means that 
 
1The referee observes the one small economy that is notably absent from the list of 
booms and busts is Belgium. It would be useful to identify the sources of this 
stability, and whether they could be adapted to reduce future volatility in the Irish 
market. 
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the size of price falls can be predicted from the size of the price rise 
that preceded them.  
Figure 1: House Prices Relative to Disposable Income in Smaller OECD 
Economies Since 1970.  Index: 2000 equals 100 
Figure 2 plots the size of increase in house prices for 17 OECD 
economies, against its subsequent fall.2 For clarity, we exclude other 
variables such as interest rates that other studies find to have limited 
explanatory power for house prices: we are focusing on weak form 
efficiency of housing markets.  
To estimate the peaks and troughs in each series for each 
country, we first calculated percentage changes for each quarter.  A 
Friedman supersmoother (implemented in the R statistics package) 
was then applied to the percentage changes to eliminate short-run 
fluctuations. Peaks and troughs were then identified as the end of 
runs of positive or negative changes in the smoothed series, and actual 
price changes calculated between these points.  
Percentage rises and subsequent falls are calculated relative to 
different values: troughs and peaks respectively. Remember that a 
rise of p per cent only needs a fall of p/(1 + p) per cent to reverse it. 
To eliminate this complication, all rises in Figure 2 and subsequent 
regressions are expressed as a percentage of peak values: for example 
a rise from 50 to 100 is treated as a 50 per cent rise, rather than a 100 
per cent one.   
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2These economies are Denmark; Finland; Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; New 
Zealand; Sweden; Switzerland; United States; Japan; Germany; France; Italy; Britain; 
Canada; Australia and Spain. 
Figure 2 shows that there is a strong linkage between rises in real 
house prices and subsequent falls. There is one evident outlier 
corresponding to a dip in house prices in Spain that occurred in the 
early 1990s in an otherwise continuously up-ward trend that saw real 
prices quadruple between the mid-1980s and the present.  
Figure 2: Percentage Rises in Real House Prices (Expressed as a 
Percentage of Peak Values), and Subsequent Falls for 
OECD Economies Since 1970  
 
Table 2 shows a regression of the percentage fall in house prices 
against their previous rise, both including and excluding the Spanish 
early-1990s outlier, for real house prices and the house price to 
income ratio. The slope of -0.7 for real house price means that 70 
per cent of the rise during a boom (expressed relative to the peak 
value) is lost during the subsequent bust.  
It is worth emphasising that these regressions are simply a 
summary of data. Beyond being a standard test of weak form 
efficiency of the housing market, they do not purport to test any 
model. In particular, the approach here can convey no information 
about the timing and magnitude of peaks preceding troughs.  
By comparison Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) find weaker mean-
reversion in house prices in US metropolitan areas: a one dollar rise 
over five years is typically followed by a fall of 30 cents over the 
following five years.  
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Table 2: Predictability of House Price Falls from Preceding House Price Rises  
 Intercept Initial Rise SER R2 BP N 
 
 Real House Prices 
  
All -0.0489 
(0.0363) 
-0.5746** 
(0.131) 
 
0.1085 0.3548 0.022 37 
Excl. Spain -0.0252 
(0.0356) 
-0.7025** 
(0.1347) 
0.1021 0.4445 0.483 36 
  
 House Prices Relative to Disposable Income 
  
All -0.1168** 
(0.0389) 
-0.6115** 
(0.1899) 
 
0.1275 0.219 0.187 39 
Excl. Spain -0.104** 
(0.0395) 
-0.713** 
(0.2013) 
0.1259 0.2584 0.428 38 
OLS regression of percentage falls in real house prices and house prices relative to income on 
preceding rises for 17 OECD economies from 1970 to the present. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 *denotes significance at 5 per cent, ** at 1 per cent. BP is p-value of studentised Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
What is notable about the diagram and regressions is how strong 
the relationship between price rises and falls is. Across very different 
housing markets in very different economies over a period of more 
than 30 years, there is a common relationship between the 
magnitude of booms and subsequent busts. Rent-price series show 
similar mean reversion but because of the small size of the rented 
sector in many economies, and the presence of rent controls in part 
of the period, the data are not as reliable as the real price and price-
income series.  
As always, national averages conceal substantial variations across 
regions and types of property. During the last British housing crash, 
for example, while selling prices nationally fell on average by 10 per 
cent, they fell in East Anglia by 40 per cent; while models such as 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) predict that the upper end of the 
market should be the most volatile.  
As Table 1 suggests, there is a relationship between the 
magnitude of real price falls and their duration.  Table 3 gives the 
results of a regression of the average annual rate of house price falls 
on their magnitude, and shows the two to be closely related.  If p is 
the proportionate price fall, so prices fall from 1 to 1 - p over t 
years, it follows that r = ln(1 - p)/t is the average rate of decline. 
Table 3 gives the results of a regression of r on p.  For every 10 per 
cent extra decline in real prices, the annual rate of decline rises by 
1.5 percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Rate Versus Magnitude of Falls in Real House Prices for 
17 OECD Economies Since 1970  
 
Table 3: Connection Between Annual Rate of Decline and 
Magnitude of House Price Falls  
Intercept Price Fall SER R2 BP N 
 
-1.6784** 
(0.4709) 
0.1494** 
(0.0206) 
 
1.6434 0.6014 0.121 37 
OLS regression of average rate of fall of real house prices on percentage fall for 17 
OECD economies from 1970 to the present. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *denotes significance at 5 per cent, ** at 1 per cent. BP is p-value of studentised 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 The evidence of nearly 40 cycles in house prices for 17 OECD 
economies since 1970 shows that real house prices typically give up 
about 70 per cent of their rise in the subsequent fall, and that these 
falls occur slowly.  
4. 
 The Irish 
Housing 
Bubble, 
Causes and 
Consequences 
Before looking at what these numbers may imply for Ireland, it 
is necessary to dispose of the idea that Irish house prices merely 
reflect strong fundamentals: rising income and increased household 
formation due to the age structure of the population, declining 
household size, rising employment, and immigration.  
This argument is hard to sustain. If the rise in house prices 
were due to increased income and more people needing somewhere 
to live, we would have observed rents rising alongside house prices. 
Figure 4 shows how house prices have risen far faster than either 
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 rents or income. In fact, while rents doubled relative to income 
between 1995 and 2000, the ratio has remained unchanged since. 
The failure of rents to rise, along with the number of recently built 
units that have been bought but are lying empty (FitzGerald, 2005), 
suggests that the Irish housing market has left the dull world of 
fundamental values far behind it.  
Figure 4: Irish House Prices Since 1970 in Real Terms, Relative to Income, and 
Relative to Rent. Index: 1995 Equals 100  
 
A back of envelope calculation of the fundamental price of 
housing is the following. Abstracting from maintenance costs 
(which typically run around one month’s rent) suppose that housing 
generates an annual rent of n. This is a fraction ν of disposable 
income y  which is expected  to grow  through  time at rate g.  The 
present value of this infinite income stream is then  
p =  νy
        r - g 
where r is the discount rate. As Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 show, 
housing is not a risk-free asset, and this discount rate needs to 
exceed the risk-free rate by an amount reflecting the fundamental risk 
of the asset. For housing, fundamental risk is large: housing is the 
largest item by far in most people’s asset portfolio and price changes 
are strongly correlated with income growth. To be conservative, 
however, we can assign a value of r of 8 per cent, equal to the long run 
real return on equities.  
The ratio of fundamental price to rent is 1/(r - g). To explain 
why Irish house prices have doubled relative to rent since 2000 we 
need to ask if there is any reason to suppose that new information 
has arrived causing long run estimates of (r -g) to be rationally halved. 
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Ireland’s stagnant exports, diminishing competitiveness, and the 
increasing structural problems of sectors such as IT and 
pharmaceuticals, would suggest that estimates of long-run income 
growth for the Irish economy g should have fallen in this period.  
While it may be the case that increased international demand for 
quality assets may be driving down equilibrium returns (Caballero, 
2006), there is no reason to believe that long-run expected returns on 
risky assets r have halved in the past 7 years.  
As White (2006) has observed, there is considerable variation in 
price-rent ratios within Dublin, with values in the range 80-100 at 
the top of the market. These values recall the peaks of the dotcom 
bubble and can be rationalised, with a discount rate r ≈ 0.08, only 
with real long-run growth of income of 6 to 7 per cent, equivalent to 
a doubling of real income every 10-12 years. This is the rate achieved 
by Korea during its transition from effectively the stone age to an 
industrial economy but has not been remotely approached by any 
rich economy. Alternatively, assuming an equilibrium price-rent ratio 
in the region of 15, it suggests that large falls in prices, of the order of 
85 per cent, might be needed for the top of the market to return to 
fundamental value.  
Again it is worth reminding ourselves that, just as in stock 
markets, fundamental measures such as price-earnings ratios have 
limited explanatory power for price changes in the short run.  
While other parts of the market appear less over-valued, they are 
still expensive by international standards. The Global Property 
Guide website reports that the average Dublin apartment rents for 
around 4 per cent of its purchase price. Only Madrid among major 
cities has a lower ratio. By comparison, London apartments return 
nearly 6 per cent, and Amsterdam and Paris over 8 per cent.  
 
 Were Ireland to experience the same housing dynamics as every 
other OECD economy, except Spain in the early 1990s, what sort 
of price changes might be expected?  Recall that Table 2 predicts 
a 7 per cent fall for every 10 per cent rise (relative to peak values) 
of real prices from their trough level, with a standard error of 10 per 
cent.  
5. 
International 
Perspectives 
on the Irish 
Housing 
Bubble 
Since the mid-1990s, real house prices have risen from an index 
level of 100 to around 350, and increase in terms of peak value of 70 
per cent. If 70 per cent of this rise were to be subsequently lost – as 
occurred during our previous bust in the early 1980s – the predicted 
fall in real house prices would be 50 per cent with a standard error 
of 10 per cent. In other words, a 68 per cent confidence interval for 
price falls would be in the range of 40 to 60 per cent. There would 
be one chance in eight of a price fall of only 30 to 40 per cent, just 
as there is a predicted one chance in eight of a fall of 60 to 70 per 
cent.  
Similarly, Table 2 predicts, given an approximately 70 per cent 
rise in the price income ratio, that the price income ratio will fall 
by around 60 per cent, with a standard error of around 12.5 per 
cent.  
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 It must be emphasised that these estimates are extrapolations: no 
economy in our sample of busts following booms experienced a rise 
as large as Ireland's. A fall in real prices of 50 per cent from Table 3, 
implies a predicted annual rate of decline of around 9 per cent, with a 
standard error of approximately 1.5 per cent. This translates into a 
decline of around 8 years, of the same order of magnitude as that 
experienced in the Netherlands in the 1980s or Britain in the 1950s. 
Assuming an inflation rate of 2 per cent, this implies an annual fall 
in selling prices of 7 per cent.  
These estimates may be unduly optimistic. In all the housing 
cycles on which the regression was based, housing stock was, for 
practical purposes, fixed. In Ireland, by contrast, the number of 
housing units is growing at around 5 per cent per year, which would 
suggest the potential for larger falls than those experienced in other 
OECD housing slowdowns.  
5.1 FUNDAMENTAL REGRESSIONS  
The prediction that Ireland may experience house price falls in the 
range of 50 per cent, is a good way from the OECD estimate (Rae 
and van den Noord, 2006) that Irish houses are overvalued by only 
around 20 per cent. However, the OECD methodology, and that of 
similar studies, is problematic. Such studies run a regression of house 
prices on interest rates, disposable income, employment and other 
fundamental variables. The regression residuals are then equated 
with the degree of over- or under-valuation in the market.  
To see this, consider a regression of Irish real house prices on 
disposable in-come since 1976 gives a residual for the last quarter 
of 2006 of 17 per cent. If instead house prices had changed by twice 
as much each quarter as they did, the regression residual would find 
that they were 35 per cent over-valued, while prices would be four 
times as high as they are now. Measuring over-valuation using 
regression residuals is a valid approach if very long-run series are 
available to tie down coefficient values, but using short-run series, as 
existing studies do, leads to meaningless results.  
5.2  MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES  
House price falls have three effects. First, households feel less 
wealthy and consume less.  Evidence from the United States points 
to a final long-run marginal propensity to consume from housing 
wealth of around 10 per cent: a $100,000 rise in property values, 
increases household consumption eventually by a total of $10,000 
(Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek, 2006). Second, banks face more bad 
loans, and become more cautious in their lending, leading to further 
falls in creditworthiness through the standard financial accelerator. 
Finally, the value of Tobin's q for residential investment falls, 
reducing house building. Most countries devote about 5 per cent of 
national income to building houses and in a typical housing bust, 
this falls to around 4 per cent of national income.  
In most cases then, housing busts are uncomfortable, but not 
macroeconomically disastrous events.  How about Ireland?  There 
is some evidence that the wealth effect on consumption might not 
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be as strong as in the United States: there has been no fall in 
personal saving in Ireland during the housing bubble, and 
households have not consumed home equity through second 
mortgages (Hogan and O'Sullivan, 2006). Similarly, the larger banks 
which dominate lending are well capitalised and the banking system 
has, until recently at least, avoided the worst excesses of the sub-
prime mortgage market, although it is likely that many interest-only 
and 100 per cent mortgages could go sour, especially given the ease 
with which delinquent borrowers can relocate to England.  
It is the scale of the Irish house building industry that makes a 
fall in house prices potentially troubling. While most economies 
derive only 5 per cent of their income directly from residential 
construction, in Ireland house building accounts for around 15 per 
cent of national income.  
Effectively, the recent growth of the Irish economy looks similar to 
the unstable case of an old-fashioned multiplier-accelerator model. 
The employment growth in the Celtic Tiger period of the 1990s led 
to increased demand for housing, reflected in rising real house 
prices and rent to income ratios. This stimulated house building, 
which generated more employment, leading to more demand for 
housing, and so on. Effectively, the Irish economy has come to be 
driven by building houses for all the people whose jobs have come, 
directly or indirectly, from building houses.  
It is hard to envisage how a fall in house building from 15 per 
cent to 5 per cent of national income might be achieved without 
considerable macroeconomic dislocation. Building booms, 
moreover, tend to end suddenly:  the example of Arizona in the 
summer of 2006 shows how a housing market can move in the 
space of a few months from buyers queuing overnight to buy, to 
empty tracts of new houses being priced below construction cost and 
still failing to sell.  
 
 This paper has taken an international perspective on the Irish 
housing boom. We have shown that there is a close relationship 
historically across very different economies and housing markets 
between the size of increases in real house prices, and subsequent 
declines. If this relationship were to hold for Ireland, the expected 
fall in average real house prices is in the range 40 to 60 per cent, over 
a period of around 8 years. Such a fall would return the ratio of house 
prices to rents to its level at the start of the decade.  Given the 
unusual reliance of the Irish economy on building houses, the 
effects of any such fall on national income may be somewhat larger 
than that experienced at the end of other housing bubbles.  
6.  
Conclusions 
Policy implications are straightforward. Booms and busts are a 
normal part of property markets. The government did not cause the 
current boom, and is powerless to do anything about a subsequent 
bust. In particular, cuts in stamp duty will not change buyers’ self-
fulfilling incentive to wait and see if prices fall further.  
Blanchard (2006) has observed that Euro-area economies appear 
at risk of rotating recessions:  increased domestic demand drives up 
real wages and erodes competitiveness, but the impossibility of 
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 devaluing means that prolonged rises in unemployment become the 
only means to reduce real wages. Notable current examples are Italy 
and Portugal. There may be some risk that the sharp fall in Irish 
competitiveness since 2000, which has been disguised and, to some 
extent, caused by the construction boom, may require a lengthy 
period of high unemployment to reverse.  
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